Introduction
In Latin America and elsewhere, the nature of property rights regimes has great influence on pat terns of water and other natural resource develop ment, and hence on regional economic development in general. In capitalist societies, of course, property rights are predominantly "private," but their actual form and content are shaped by a wide range of pol itical, economic, legal and social institutions. How to define the boundary and relations between "public" and "private" thus becomes a crucial and contested question.
In the case of water the question is particularly complicated. In part this reflects water's physical na ture -its mobility, fluidity, versatility and vital import ance give it an inherently public character. Property rights regarding water are also affected by different geographic conditions. The question of whether the climate is arid or humid is widely believed to exert a strong influence on water rights regimes: the scarcity or abundance of water influences which land uses or other economic activities are most feasible, and this in tum influences legal rules on water use and control.
This belief may become a sort of "environmental II determinism", according to which societies in arid climates the world over tend to develop similar sys tems of water law which differ markedly from those developed by societies in humid climates.
The premise of this paper is that Latin American 
Water resource development and policy issues in Latin America
Latin America is characterized by wide variations of environmental and climatic conditions. This is so not only between different nations -e.g., Mexico is gener ally more arid than Brazil-but also within nations, as nearly all of them have both arid and humid regions -e.g., northern vs. southern Mexico, western vs. east ern Argentina, etc. Such variety, when combined with the geographic distribution of different economic ac tivities, leads to a wide range of supply and demand 1 By "regime" I mean both the legal conception of property rights themselves, as well as the associated complex or public institu tions through which such rights are concretely expressed.
conditions for water resources, and hence of problems for water law, policy, and management.
Notwithstanding such variety, there arc several economic, social and political factors that are com mon to water resource issues in most of Latin Ameri ca. As identified in a United Nations analysis in 1980, these factors are: growth in both population and econ omic production; increasing urbanization (i.e., geo graphic concentration of development); water resources which are abundant but typically distant from population centres; rapid adoption of modern technology; and centralization of both political and WATER PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE STATE: THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE ♦ CARL J. BAUER economic power and decision-making. These com bine to produce two principal kinds of water resource problems: i) problems of quantity, regulation of flow, and water and land use conflicts; and ii) urban problems of bad water quality, especially associated with poverty (United Nations/ECLAC/UNEP, 1980). This and subsequent analyses have shown the need for more integrated institutional operations, more equitable distribution of both costs and benefits of water development, and more effective and participa tory long-term planning (see also eclac, 1989) .
Reaching any of these objectives will depend in large part on the nature of property rights regimes and the role of the State.2
III
Contradictions between private property and economic development Private property is an idea and institution that has been much argyed and fought over. Both its propo nents and critics, however, have often failed to distin guish among different kinds of and justifications for private property, thereby mixing together arguments that are not always compatible and may even be contradictory.3
The classic political argument, for example, is that private property is the best guarantee of individ ual liberty, delimiting a private sphere of activity within which State intervention is prohibited. This ar gument may also have moral or philosophical aspects, since such liberty includes the right to individual selfexpression, free will, and the like (Ramos, 1991) . The classic economic arguments are twofold, but need not go together: the first is.that private property stimu lates production and productivity by giving rightsholders incentives both to labour and to invest wealth, since they are guaranteed the fruits of their activities.
The second is that such property is vital to the oper ation of markets, since the exchange of goods and services is impossible unless people have exclusive and alienable rights to their possession.4 Note that these two arguments, although commonly associated, are logically independent since production incentives do not necessarily imply a market economy.
These political arid economic arguments come into fundamental conflict, when a private property regime is combined with rapid economic growth and industrialization. Under such dynamic conditions of capitalist development, the need for security of exist ing private rights clashes with the demand for econ omic and technological change, which involves newer claims to resources. This has been the case in many parts of Latin America during the 20th century, espe cially since the Second World War, and is also clearly illustrated by the example of the 19th century United
States. During that century U.S. law underwent a fun damental transformation, from a system of customary rules inherited from England, based on substantive notions such as "fairness" and "equity," to a utilita rian conception in which laws were used as policy instruments to stimulate economic expansion. Such diverse areas of law as property, contracts, torts, and corporations were reshaped to free private initiative from its traditional social obligations, to promote what the legal historian Willard Hurst called the "re lease of creative energy." Property law in particular lost its traditionally static character, rooted in protect ing the "quiet enjoyment" of land ownership, to become both more dynamic and more abstract: exist ing vested rights were increasingly disregarded in favor of newer commercial ventures, which helped to 2In this paper I am concerned with issues of water quantity rather than quality; nonetheless, many of my conclusions are directly applicable to the latter as well, in that they deal with the relation between State-authority and different kinds of private property rights.
3 Useful surveys of property theory are given in MacPherson (ed.), 1978 and Reeve, 1986. fuel economic expansion.5 Water rights, as we will see below, played a leading role in this transformation.
These changes in property law resulted from repeated State intervention. The chronic scarcity of capital in the 19th century U.S. induced state and national legislatures to grant special legal privileges to any private interests that would stimulate econ omic development, e.g. by building infrastructure -roads, canals, bridges, etc.-or by exploiting natu ral resources in the public domain. Prominent among these "legal subsidies" to private parties was the grant of the government's eminent domain powers, which allowed the expropriation of private property when necessary for a "public use" or "public purpose."6 Despite their usual protection of vested rights, the courts supported this legislative policy because of the shared conviction that economic growth was a "public purpose" regardless of the dis tributional consequences (Scheiber, 1973; Scheiber and McCurdy, 1975) . By the end of the century, however, legal policies of this sort had resulted in such concentration of economic and political power, and therefore social tension and inequality, that reform movements were able to modify the legal system in the direction of increased public regulation (Hurst, 1956) .
IV
Water as a problem for private property regimes
Water is a substance whose peculiar characteristics blur the public/private distinction and pose serious problems for private property as usually understood. 7 These third-party effects have led one prominent "law and economics" figure from the University of Chicago to argue that water is an exception to the principle that property should be shaped by and for the market (Posner, 1977 Developing water-power required building dams that blocked natural streamflow and created reservoirs, then letting the water through at irregular intervals.
Since this was a clear violation of others' riparian rights, both upstream and downstream, for many years the courts routinely ruled against mill-owners in lawsuits; by the late 18th and early 19th centuries, however, they came to approve new state legislation that gave power developers priority over riparian landowners. This change of policy and principle was justified by the utilitarian concern to promote indus trialization and economic growth (Horwitz, 1977; Scheiber, 1973) .
Aside from this modification the riparian doctrine retained its key features of prohibiting off-stream con sumption and ensuring equal sharing of available water.
In the arid West, however, these rules in turn became (Dunbar, 1983) . In the following case study I will argue that this interpretation is wrong on (Pisani, 1984) .
of hydroelectricity emerged and grew rapidly, air though State policy and intervention in water resource development remained preoccupied with irrigation.
The eventual transformation of this State role both responded to, and had a major impact on, the pattern of regional economic development.* * guished from an aesthetic benefit." (Morris, 1956, p. 258 The position of hydroelectric power interests was also more ambivalent than it first appeared. Since their water use was non-consumptive, they initially preferred the riparian doctrine, and helped to defeat some early versions of the Code (Dunbar, 1983) . Thus a water rights system which had originally been designed mainly for irrigation (a consumptive use)
proved to be equally suited to hydroelectric power (a non-consumptive use), despite their apparently con tradictory needs.
In conclusion, the climatic differences proved to be more important to the initial debates over water rights doctrines than to the institutional structure that wanted an end to the confusion and had a strong stake in overall regional economic investment and growth.
The system of state permits to use water was a move toward centralized administrative control, and away from the judiciary with its traditional concern for pri vate rights, but it solved part of the "problem" of private property in water. Water rights were still userights, but they were now more secure and predictable than they had been before, and thereby encouraged private investment. In 1899 the legislature passed companion statutes (Chapters 130 and 131) giving both lumber companies and irrigators the power to condemn property as needed for rights-of-way. In 1903, in its first major decision in this area, the Court overturned the former statute and flatly rejected the argument that an expanding private lumber industry generated "public" benefits:
"It cannot be that, within the meaning of the Constitution, the distinction between public policy and public use is to be obliterated.... The use under consideration must be either a use by the public, or by some agency which is quasi-public, and not simply a use which may incidentally or indirectly promote the public interest or general prosperity of the state."23 y Lumber Company v. Morris (1903), 74 Pac 681. 684-5. From 1905 to 1927, the Court applied the same logic to deny private power companies the right to condemn land for damsites and reservoirs. Since they were producing electricity for commercial sale, either to private industry or to the public without public service obligations, they could not justifiably be given such legal privileges.24
Irrigators got different treatment, however. In 1904 the Court confirmed the second statute without a blink, and in 1910 even extended the privilege to a private land speculation company; it was "immaterial" that the investors were speculating in canal systems rather than planning to actually raise crops, because "irrig ation will promote the public good." The Court ex plained, in stark contrast to its earlier reasoning:
"The benefit to the public which supports the exercise of the power of eminent domain for purposes of this character, is not public service, but is the de velopment of the resources of the state, and the in crease of its wealth generally, by which its citizens incidentally reap a benefit." This attitude finally changed in 1927, by which time hydroelectric power had assumed new econ omic significance and State intervention was be coming politically more acceptable. When a private utility sought to condemn land to enlarge its reservoir at Lake Chelan in the eastern Cascades, planning to sell some of the electricity to private industry, the , 1918-1946. 30This is evident both in the statutes passed during this period and the Biennial Reports of the State Reclamation Board.
31 For the irrigation districts this was first mentioned as a supplemental measure in a 1915 law (Chap. 179), though it was not until 1927 that they were authorized to use power sales to underwrite and repay bonds (State Reclamation Act, Chap. 254).
On the Columbia Basin project, see Harding, 1954 , as well as , Laws of 1919 , Chap. 60, Laws of 1927 , Chap. 260, and Laws of 1933 32 This Act concerned the reclamation of land by means of water development projects. Henceforth, this activity will be referred to as "land reclamation". productivity, and access to railroads. These projects accounted for nearly half of the state's expansion of irrigated acreage in 1900-1910, and nearly 100% of its irrigation storage capacity by 1920 (Coulter, 1951; Fahey, 1986) . Unfortunately, low crop prices and high irrigation costs, in Washington and throughout the Western states, prevented farmers from repaying the Reclamation Service, which needed continuing infu sions of cash from an unwilling Congress. Thus, the Service was on the verge of financial collapse in the 1920s (Gates, 1968) . (Dodds, 1986; MacColl, 1979) . By 1920 the two utilities produced 25% of the state's total hydropower33 and continued to expand and build new dams, arguing for the right to provide service beyond city limits. They were backed by a coalition of urban Progressives, la bour unions, and farmers (some of the latter were populists and some were simply frustrated at the pri vate utilities* failure to provide rural services). In 1923 they got a bill to this effect passed by the legislature and it was sent to a public referendum for approval.
The municipal utilities were bitterly attacked by private power companies, which produced the re maining 75% of the state's hydropower. Two of these companies were most important, one in eastern Wash ington and one in the west, each of which produced more than the city utilities combined. The private companies complained of unfair competition, since the city utilities were exempt both from paying taxes and from regulation by the Public Service Com mission. Together with other business interests and political conservatives, the private utilities organized yi Biennial Reports, 1917 -1920 a massive publicity campaign against the bill, warn ing of a dangerous increase in governmental power and a threat to individual freedom, and thus suc ceeded in defeating the referendum (Fahey, 1986; Ficken, 1979) . (Hays, 1959) .
Even so there was little actual development until the economic crisis of the 1930s, when part of Presi dent Franklin D. Roosevelt's "New Deal" included massive public works projects that were intended 34 Capacity increased from 380 000 to 700 000 hp between 1920 and 1928 (84%, or more than 10% per year), and then to 1 000 000 hp by 1936 (an additional 43%, or more than 5% per year at the height of the Depression). See Biennial Reports, 1920-1936, State Department of Conservation and Development. both to provide public employment and to fuel re gional economic development. lb achieve the latter goal, Federal agencies drew on the hard lessons of previous decades by making hydroelectricity the cen tral element in multiple-purpose water projects; in this "cash register dam" strategy, power revenues were used to subsidize less economically viable water uses such as irrigation, flood control, and recreation.
The Bureau of Reclamation (the new name of the Reclamation Service), in particular, followed this strategy to save itself from being abolished, thereby entering upon several decades of bureaucratic growth and prosperity, even though irrigation remained its official purpose (Gates, 1968; Swain, 1970) . A key illustration of this is that the hard-fought implementation of a Water Code supposedly de signed for the needs of arid-country agriculture was almost immediately followed by the rise to domin ance of water-power for urban and industrial pur poses -with the bulk of that energy produced in the arid part of the state.
Second, the nature of private property under capitalism is more ambiguous than either its propo nents or opponents often realize. The security of pri vate rights necessary to stimulate capital investment in Washington was only achieved at the expense of other property rights that were equally private and equally market-oriented, but less amenable to maximized economic growth or capital accumulation.
For political, economic and social reasons, therefore, it may be necessary to favour some kinds of private property but not others, and arguments supporting one kind do not necessarily support another -a point which is usually lost in both ideological and prag matic debates.
Third, the evolution of the Washington water rights regime highlights both the historical and conti nuing dependence of private property and capital ac cumulation on State intervention. Although private rights to water became defined as administrative per mits for its use, these functioned in fact as a capitalist form of private property, encouraging capital invest ment and market-oriented economic development.
Such a system is absolutely dependent on continued State maintenance of its rules, premises and practical necessities: resolving conflicts, gathering and keeping technical data and legal information, and so forth.
Thus "property," like "the market", must not only be understood as a socially and collectively created in stitution -it must also be appreciated that it cannot successfully function otherwise.
Fourth, the crucial importance of State involve ment in both types of water development is evident.
In Washington, both state and national governmental activity began as a reaction to economic conditions -to the stagnation of irrigated agriculture on one hand, and to the promise of hydroelectricity on the other-but once established it then became the sine qua non of regional growth. Furthermore, the inte grated and multiple-purpose character of water use was due entirely to central governmental control.
Finally, the property regime adopted in 
